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HOW SHOULD THE PAST
INFORM THE FUTURE?
REVIEWING REGULATING INTERNET
GAMING: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES1
Keith C. Miller*
I. INTRODUCTION
Predictions for the growth of Internet gambling2 in the United States con-
fidently intone that it is not a matter of if, but when, the US will embrace this
new market for gambling.3 Technological innovations for online gaming prod-
ucts have dazzled the world with their creativity.4 Although the US prides itself
on its leadership in matters of commerce and technology, it is curiously behind
the curve when it comes to Internet gambling. Globally, over 30 countries pro-
1 REGULATING INTERNET GAMING: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES (Anthony Cabot &
Ngai Pindell eds., 2013).
* Ellis and Nelle Levitt Distinguished Professor of Law, Drake University. Many thanks to
my research assistant David Ranscht for his research, editing, and thoughtful insights.
2 This article uses the terms “gambling” and “gaming” interchangeably, setting aside any
implication that “gaming” is friendlier or more benign, or that “gambling” is pejorative. To
draw fine lines between the terms would be to make a distinction without much difference.
See, e.g., M. Neil Browne et al., The Role of Ethics in Regulatory Discourse: Can Market
Failure Justify the Regulation of Casino Gaming?, 78 NEB. L. REV. 37, 40 n.11 (1999); C.
Jeremy Pope, Comment, Losing the Battle but Winning the War: The Federal Government’s
Attempts to Regulate Internet Gaming through Utilization of the Wire Act and Other Means,
74 MISS. L.J. 903, 903 n.1 (2005). Some distinguish the terms somewhat differently, and
suggest that online “gaming” is more about the story—think World of Warcraft—whereas
“gambling” is primarily concerned with the chance to profit. See Symposium, The Law &
the Future of Gaming, 16 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 127, 144 (2013); see also Bradley S.
Fiorito, Comment, Calling a Lemon a Lemon: Regulating Electronic Gambling Machines to
Contain Pathological Gambling, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1325, 1335 n.75 (2006) (suggesting
that “gambling” involves actual wagers, whereas “gaming” does not).
3 See, e.g., 2013 Gaming Industry Forecast: Introduction, CASINO ENTERPRISE MGMT., Jan.
2, 2013, available at http://www.casinoenterprisemanagement.com/articles/january-2013/
2013-gaming-industry-forecast-introduction; see also Robert W. Stocker II & Peter J.
Kulick, Welcome to Legalized I-Gaming in North America, CASINO LAW., Autumn 2013, at
21, available at http://www.gaminglawmasters.com/magazines/casino/CLFall2013SMALL
ER.pdf (suggesting that policymakers have grown comfortable with the concept of Internet
gaming, and as a result, their focus has shifted from whether to allow it “to how to regulate
[it]”).
4 See, e.g., Marian Green, The Future of Gaming is Now, CASINO ENTERPRISE MGMT., Oct.
1, 2013, available at http://www.casinoenterprisemanagement.com/articles/october-2013/
future-gaming-now (“[T]he pace of digital technology and related trends speeds up through-
out society . . . . [and is] pushing the envelope for innovation on and off the casino floor.”).
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vide for and regulate online gambling in some form or another, including large
European countries such as France and Italy, and countries within the United
Kingdom.5 In contrast, Internet gambling currently has a modest presence in
the US.6 On the other hand, the US has an almost unrivalled depth of experi-
ence in the regulation of brick and mortar casino gambling.7 Ultimately, if
Internet gambling is to flourish in the US, or in any jurisdiction, it will require a
robust and trustworthy regulatory framework that inspires confidence. How
will this framework be established? What are its vital elements?
Addressing these questions is an impressive new book, Regulating
Internet Gaming: Challenges and Opportunities, edited by gaming law attorney
and professor, Anthony Cabot and Associate Dean at the University of Nevada,
Las Vegas William S. Boyd School of Law, Ngai Pindell. The eleven sepa-
rately-authored chapters of the book provide a detailed, comprehensive picture
of many of the components of an effective regulatory system for Internet gam-
bling. The book does not limit its scope to Internet gambling issues in the US.
Indeed, it draws substantially from experiences of jurisdictions around the
world. However, the relative infancy of online betting in the US, and the mar-
ket potential of the country, makes the US an important “emerging” jurisdic-
tion. Therefore, the book’s prescriptions of the features for an appropriate
Internet gambling regulatory template will be useful as the debate about
Internet gambling in the US continues. Likewise, any jurisdiction considering
development and regulation of an Internet gaming industry will benefit from
the lessons of this book.
The Editors’ Note to the book provides a perspective that informs the ori-
entation and theme of the book throughout. The editors see Nevada’s legaliza-
tion of online gaming in 2013 as a signal event because it marked the initial
American foray into licensing online gaming products.8 Until that time, the
licensing and offering of Internet gaming products, in many instances products
consumed by gamblers in the US, had been the province of a handful of coun-
tries throughout the world.9 But in establishing their online gaming protocols,
these jurisdictions had drawn upon the wealth of experience of the US casino
industry in regulating brick and mortar casinos. The synergy between the US
and other countries, and that existing between brick and mortar regulation and
regulation of online gaming, is the thread that runs throughout the book. As the
5 See David O. Stewart, Online Gambling Five Years After UIGEA, AM. GAMING ASS’N
4–5 (May 2011), http://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/uploads/docs/final_on
line_gambling_white_paper_5-18-11.pdf; see also GAMBLINGCOMPLIANCE, MARKET BARRI-
ERS 2013/2014: A EUROPEAN ONLINE GAMBLING STUDY 8 (2013), http://www.gamblingcom
pliance.com/files/MB3%20Exec%20Summary.pdf (providing a Europe-specific map catego-
rizing the various regulatory schemes across the continent).
6 Only three states—Delaware, Nevada, and New Jersey—have legalized online gaming.
See N.J. to Start Internet Gambling Nov. 26, USA TODAY (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.usa
today.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/04/apnewsbreak-nj-to-start-internet-gambling-nov-26/
2921703/.
7 This article references “brick and mortar,” “land based,” and “terrestrial” gaming. For this
Article’s purposes, the three terms are interchangeable because each term describes the same
thing: gaming that takes place at a physical location rather than in cyberspace.
8 REGULATING INTERNET GAMING: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 1, at ix.
9 Id.
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Editors’ Note itself states, “This book builds on the experiences of both Ameri-
can and international regulatory systems to describe current approaches and
suggest best practices for the development of Internet gaming regulation and
infrastructure globally.”10
It is this blend of descriptive experiences and prescriptive “best practices”
orientations that makes the book such a valuable tool.
II. BOOK ORGANIZATION
As noted, the book contains eleven chapters, and does not group chapters
into additional sections. It seems helpful, however, to think of the book as hav-
ing two primary components, with one other chapter being sui generis. One set
of chapters focuses on the regulatory requirements for establishing the business
of Internet gambling. This includes Licensing (chapter 1), Accounting, Audits,
and Recordkeeping (chapter 2), Taxation of Regulated Internet Gambling
(chapter 3), Technical Compliance (chapter 4), and Financial Transactions and
Money Laundering (chapter 6). These chapters discuss the fundamental regula-
tory principles directed at those setting up an Internet gambling business. They
are targeted predominantly at the relationship between regulator and licensee.
Who can operate an online gaming business? What are the attributes of a licen-
sable entity? How should these businesses be required to keep their books so
they can be meaningfully audited? What is the proper model for taxing these
business entities? How detailed do regulations of actual online game operation
need to be? What checks can we install to prevent diversion and laundering of
funds? These are the nuts and bolts questions and concerns any proposed regu-
latory system must address.
While also addressing components of a regulatory regime, the other group
of chapters deals with issues that focus attention more on the gamblers them-
selves. This includes The Protection of Customer Funds (chapter 5), Internet
Gambling Advertising Best Practices (chapter 7), Responsible Gaming (chapter
8), Ensuring Internet Gaming is Free from Fraud and Cheating (chapter 9), and
Age Verification (chapter 10). The questions here have a different tenor. How
does one make sure the gambler and the gaming operator aren’t taken advan-
tage of by cheating and fraudulent activity? What mechanisms are needed to
protect the gambler from having his banked funds looted by the operator? How
does one identify the “problem gambler” and protect him from himself? Simi-
larly, how does one identify the underage gambler and block his participation?
What is the appropriate role of regulators in restricting marketing for online
gambling? This material inevitably addresses regulation as well, but the gam-
bler’s interest in these issues is much more easily observed than in the former
set of chapters.
There is one chapter that doesn’t fit this model: Proposal for an Interna-
tional Convention on Online Gambling (chapter 11).11 All the other issues the
book chapters address have analogues in the terrestrial gaming world. Licens-
10 Id.
11 Marketa Trimble, Proposal for an International Convention on Online Gaming, in REGU-
LATING INTERNET GAMING: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 353, 353–88 (Anthony Cabot
& Ngai Pindell eds., 2013).
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ing, accounting, taxing, money tracking, technical issues, fund security, prob-
lem and underage gambling, cheating prevention—all of these are issues for
which brick and mortar casinos are also subject to regulation. Chapter 11, how-
ever, focuses on the characteristics of Internet gambling that lend themselves to
an international convention on online gambling that would enhance and inform
national regulation. It examines these issues without reference to the terrestrial
gaming environment. This chapter is discussed more specifically in a subse-
quent section of this article. Apart from this, however, the book lends itself to
organization and review along the lines set out above. This article examines
how the book addresses the regulation of online gambling, and the ways in
which the regulation of online gambling is necessarily and appropriately differ-
ent from the regulation of land-based gambling.
III. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF REGULATING THE ONLINE
GAMING BUSINESS ENTITY
A. Licensing: Keeping the Bad Guys Out
There is no area of gaming in which licensing standards are not central to
the regulatory process. In chapter 1, gaming attorney Anthony Cabot “recom-
mends a model approach for government licensure of the Internet gaming
industry.”12 The model approach differs from a “best practices” analysis
because “no best licensing practices exist” for Internet gaming and because
governments will reach different decisions regarding the appropriate specifics
of their regulatory structure.13 As Cabot notes, the licensing template for online
gaming is essentially the same as that used for terrestrial casinos. Five major
considerations form the basis of this process:
• Breadth: what is the requisite connection to the gaming industry that
warrants licensing?
• Depth: how far down into a licensable entity does the need to license
individuals go?
• Level of Review: how “intense” is the investigatory process; i.e., how
much information is collected?
• Criteria: what are the characteristics a licensing body requires of an
applicant?
• Standards: how rigidly are the criteria applied?14
So, how does the licensing process differ when online gaming is the object
of regulation, rather than a brick and mortar facility? In applying the factors
identified above, it is the breadth of the inquiry that seems to be most affected
with online gaming. Both forms of gambling extend licensing scrutiny to own-
ers, those who would be entitled to profits, and some lenders and creditors.
Further, the manufacturers of games for brick and mortar casinos require
licensing just as they do in online settings. But the Internet gaming milieu cre-
12 Anthony Cabot, Licensing, in REGULATING INTERNET GAMING: CHALLENGES AND OPPOR-
TUNITIES, supra note 1, at 1.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 11–12. These factors also have relevance to brick and mortar casinos. See
ANTHONY N. CABOT & KEITH C. MILLER, THE LAW OF GAMBLING AND REGULATED GAM-
ING: CASES AND MATERIALS viii–ix (2011).
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ates distinct challenges because so many operators, “hosted service providers,”
gaming software providers, and manufacturers of system platforms and game
content are involved. As for software providers, the author notes that “the com-
plexity of game software may go beyond the capacity of many regulatory agen-
cies to understand or test,”15 and that “[e]ven with a state-of-the-art laboratory,
some aspects of Internet gaming sites are so complex that unscrupulous persons
can still exploit them without detection.”16 This suggests that in the brave new
world of Internet gaming, licensing will be especially important “to the extent
that regulators do not have the money, expertise, or technical resources to
assure that the games are fair and honest through testing and enforcement.”17 In
other words, regulators may be dependent to a significant extent on the charac-
ter of game operators, and licensing “unsuitable” entities would be especially
damaging to the integrity of the regulatory structure.
One implication of the complexity and resource issue is that a state like
Nevada, with years of experience in brick and mortar regulation and a well-
established regulatory resource infrastructure, will have a decisive advantage
over states that are late to the game. Nevada regulators have trumpeted this
advantage, and many people feel that primacy of regulation in the Internet field
is of critical importance.18
Internet gambling also involves a number of non-gaming related service
providers that regulators may choose to license. For example, payment proces-
sors have traditionally been a fundamental part of online gaming.19 While not
involved in actually administering the gambling experience, payment proces-
sors handle player funds and possess significant player data. Somewhat surpris-
ingly, however, the author concludes that licensing these entities, “is not an
especially pressing matter.”20
The chapter also gives detailed attention to another of the licensing fac-
tors—the criteria applied to applicants by regulators. As part of this discussion,
the author poses an important question: what should US jurisdictions do about
“Internet operators that have directly or indirectly (through their licensee)
accepted US players” without state or federal law in the US authorizing such
15 Cabot, supra note 12, at 19.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.745(1) (2013); Dave Neese, State Watch: Internet Gam-
ing Turns Christie into a Gamblin’ Man, TRENTONIAN (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www
.trentonian.com/article/TT/20130415/NEWS01/130419820 (suggesting New Jersey’s deci-
sion to legalize Internet gaming was motivated in part by a desire “to establish New Jersey’s
global primacy” in the field); Letter from Brian Sandoval, Governor, State of Nev., to Sen.
Harry Reid; Sen. Mitch McConnell; Rep. John Boehner; and Rep. Nancy Pelosi (Oct. 25,
2012) available at http://quadjacks.com/wp-content/uploads/Sandoval-Letter-to-Congress-
Gaming.pdf (expressing support for a federal Internet gambling bill because it allowed for
continuing and robust state authority—an important aspect for “a state that jealously guards
its primacy in the regulation of gaming”).
19 See Andrea L. Marconi & Brian M. McQuaid, Betting and Buying: The Legality of Facil-
itating Financial Payments for Internet Gambling, 124 BANKING L.J. 483, 485 (2007)
(“Many gambling Web site operators use payment processors . . . to collect their payments
from the bettor or buyer.”).
20 Cabot, supra note 12, at 22.
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action?21 Should this be viewed as a flouting of the law, and therefore disquali-
fying? The author suggests that the answer is far from clear, and may vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.22 In fact, there are several wrinkles to the widely-
debated “bad actor” issue.23
First, the author addresses the contention that any operator who accepted
bets from US players after October 16, 2006, the Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act (UIGEA)’s effective date, was aware they were not acting
lawfully, and that this should be a disqualifying factor for licensing.24 Along
these lines, legislation proposed in California has suggested a December 31,
2006 date.25 There is one problem, however: application of a UIGEA deadline
suggests that UIGEA made accepting online wagers from US players illegal.
Yet, a widely shared view is that whatever UIGEA did do, it did not make
online gambling illegal.26 UIGEA uses the term “unlawful Internet gambling”
by reference to what is unlawful in states or according to federal law, rather
than declaring Internet gambling illegal itself.27 It thus begs the question of
whether Internet gambling truly is illegal. UIGEA attempts to choke off the
money supply to online gambling businesses by criminalizing the process
through which credit cards are used to fund online gambling accounts.28 Conse-
quently, the use of UIGEA as a per se disqualifying red line has dubious merit.
Second, as the author points out, different types of online gambling might
call for different deadlines. In 2001, the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit upheld Jay Cohen’s conviction for accepting online sports wagers from US
players.29 While UIGEA may arguably be a relevant date for acceptance of
wagers from US players on poker and games of chance, those accepting sports
21 Id. at 48.
22 Id.
23 A bad actor is an individual or company that has previously violated the law yet is seek-
ing a license under new or amended legal requirements, and a bad actor statute or clause
permits the licensing authority to consider that past violation when determining whether the
applicant is currently suitable for a license. See Melissa Jean Horne, Note, Bad Actor Stat-
utes: An Environmental Trojan Horse?, 48 VAND. L. REV. 771, 772–73 (1995). For a sample
bad actor clause that is applied to land-based gaming, see IOWA CODE § 99F.7(8)–(9)
(2011).
24 Cabot, supra note 12, at 48.
25 Id. at 48 n.81. The bill Cabot mentions has since been resubmitted in the latest legislative
session. A few provisions are amended—most notably, the license duration was extended
from five years to ten years—but the December 31, 2006 cutoff date remains the same. See
S.B. 51, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess., art. 4 (Cal. 2013) (to be codified at CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 19990.23(h)(8)) (providing that any license applicant who operated or had an inter-
est in a business that accepted wagers from US players after that date would be deemed
unsuitable to operate an Internet gambling site).
26 See, e.g., Kevin F. King, Geolocation and Federalism on the Internet: Cutting Internet
Gambling’s Gordian Knot, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 41, 45 (2010); Josh Chumbley,
Follow the Yellow Chip Road: The Path to Legalizing Internet Poker, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 547,
552 (2012); Andrew M. Nevill, Note, Folded Industry? Black Friday’s Effect on the Future
of Online Poker in the United States, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 203, 210 (2013).
27 See Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(A)
(2012).
28 See id. § 5363(1).
29 United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68, 70–71, 78 (2d Cir. 2001).
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wagers after Cohen’s conviction was affirmed clearly knew they had a flimsy
legal basis for doing so.
Third, a Nevada law passed in 1997 “prohibits a person who is not
licensed in Nevada from accepting or receiving a wager over the Internet from
a person located in Nevada.”30 Is 1997 the appropriate red line date? The
author’s thorough treatment of this issue persuasively illustrates that a cutoff
date approach is a bit simplistic and needs to be utilized carefully.
One other variation on disqualifying licensing factors is not mentioned in
the chapter. This concerns the “Black Friday” prosecutions. On April 15, 2011,
federal prosecutors unsealed indictments against the operators of the three most
popular online poker sites, alleging they violated UIGEA by tricking banks into
processing billions of dollars of payments for poker players.31 Additionally, the
indictments alleged a scheme of fraud, bribery and money laundering by these
operators.32 The story of what followed has been widely chronicled else-
where,33 but one important issue relates to the companies—and the principals
thereof—that were involved. Should the people involved in either the criminal
proceedings or the accompanying civil litigation be personae non grata if they
seek to be licensed by state or federal online gaming regulators? Again, the
question may not have a clear answer.34 For example, Nevada has inserted a
bad actor clause into its interactive gaming laws aiming to prohibit these opera-
tors from ever receiving a license unless they expressly submit to US jurisdic-
tion and waive several defenses to further liability, while New Jersey has
eschewed such a limitation.35
Because online gambling in the US is in its beginning stages, the licensing
process will likely struggle to find its bearings. As a basic template for the
30 Cabot, supra note 12, at 49 (citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 465.092 (1997)). The statute has
since been qualified; operators outside Nevada may now accept wagers from Nevadans if the
jurisdiction in which the operator is licensed has signed an agreement or compact with
Nevada allowing them to do so. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 465.094(5) (2013).
31 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Charges Principals of
Three Largest Internet Poker Companies with Bank Fraud, Illegal Gambling Offenses and
Laundering Billions in Illegal Gambling Proceeds 1 (Apr. 15, 2011), available at http://www
.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/April11/scheinbergetalindictmentpr.pdf.
32 See id.
33 See, e.g., Lawson v. Full Tilt Poker Ltd., 930 F. Supp. 2d 476, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(chronicling the various indictments and subsequent civil suits brought by players attempting
to recover funds from the seized operators); Nick Sortal, For Poker Players, No Life After
Black Friday, SUN SENTINEL (Apr. 12, 2013), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-04-12/
business/fl-poker-decline-wpt-041213-20130412_1_full-tilt-poker-world-poker-tour-online-
poker; Nevill, supra note 25, at 207, 213–17.
34 See Steve Ruddock, A Comparison of Online Gambling in New Jersey, Nevada, and
Delaware, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.nj.com/onlinegamblingnj/in
dex.ssf/2013/09/a_comparison_of_online_gamblin.html (comparing the three states that
have already legalized Internet gambling and noting no two have approached this issue
identically).
35 Compare 2013 Nev. Laws Ch. 2 (A.B. 114), §§ 3, 10(6)(a)–(b) (amending NEV. REV.
STAT. § 463.750), with Hoa Nguyen, American Indian Tribes Oppose New Jersey’s Internet
Gambling Measure, THE AEGIS (Apr. 27, 2013), available at 2013 WLNR 10378352. Per-
haps New Jersey omitted a bad actor clause in an attempt to attract experienced operators
and compete with Nevada, especially given the fact that online play in New Jersey recently
began in November 2013. See N.J. to Start Internet Gambling Nov. 26, supra note 6.
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issues that need to be addressed and a thoughtful analysis of what the US can
learn from the rest of the world, chapter 1 is an invaluable resource for regula-
tors and those interested in the development of Internet gambling businesses.
B. The Money
A theme that runs through several of the chapters focuses on the basics of
the regulatory scheme and the need for regulators to identify the purposes of
their regulation of the Internet gaming model. Without such an understanding,
regulators will struggle to develop a coherent and workable set of rules. The
regulatory purposes that inform the regulation of terrestrial gaming will likely
differ in important respects from the regulatory purposes affecting online gam-
ing. In chapter 2 (Accounting, Audits, and Recordkeeping), attorney Peter
Kulick clearly demonstrates how important it is for regulators to be aware of
these differences. As he notes:
The economic model, cost structure, means of operating games and the
roles of suppliers differ in the Internet gaming industry from that of the land-
based gaming industry. Accordingly, effective Internet gaming laws and regu-
lations must be sensitive to these differences and embrace regulatory
approaches that adhere to the realities of the Internet gaming industry.36
1. Identifying It
What are these “realities” to which the author is referring? Perhaps the
most significant feature is that the “flow of money in the operation of an
Internet gaming operation differs from brick and mortar casinos.”37 Typically,
a player will use a credit or debit card to transfer money to the Internet gaming
operator.38 The funds transferred are then held in an account in the player’s
name.39
As the author notes, standard accounting practices are not well suited to
land-based casinos because of the millions of dollars that change hands from
player to casino to another player.40 Requiring a complete record of each gam-
ing transaction would quickly bring the action to a halt. Instead, casinos use a
form of aggregate accounting where revenue results are observed over a stated
period of time.41 But in one important sense, the conventional method of fund-
ing Internet accounts may offer advantages in the auditing and accounting
processes. Online gaming—indeed, all online activity—leaves an electronic
trail that can be stored and later retrieved for accounting and audit purposes.
This “affords the opportunity to depart from aggregate accounting.”42 Internal
controls must be established and adhered to for either form of accounting to
operate effectively.43 But as the author explains, the internal controls for brick
36 Peter J. Kulick, Accounting, Audits, and Recordkeeping, in REGULATING INTERNET GAM-
ING: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 1, at 55, 57.
37 Id. at 58.
38 Id. at 58-60.
39 Id. at 60.
40 Id. at 63–64.
41 See id. at 64.
42 Id.
43 See CABOT & MILLER, supra note 14, at 48–49.
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and mortar casinos are not completely transferable to online gaming.44 The
challenge for regulators is to be sensitive to the ways in which internal controls
for online gaming need to depart from the traditional protocols developed over
the years for land-based casinos. While the land-based casino setting offers
guidance, best practices for Internet gambling will likely be a product of refer-
ence to jurisdictions that have an established online regulatory regime. Many of
the “guiding principles” for audits, accounting, and record-keeping identified
by the author show the influence of these jurisdictions.45
2. Taxing It
Few would doubt that states do not allow and regulate gambling just for
the sheer enjoyment of players. Tax revenue produced from gaming activity is
an integral component of the dynamics of legalized gambling.46 Indeed, the
licensing and accounting/audit prescriptions discussed in the book exist in part
because of the need to insure that the taxing entity receives the revenues pre-
scribed by law. This won’t happen if unscrupulous people are licensed, or if
accounting practices are not scrupulously followed.
There is considerable debate in the US regarding the proper tax rate for
casinos,47 and wide variation in the rates states assess.48 But whatever the rate,
the general consensus seems to be that the taxable amounts for land-based casi-
nos are the proceeds—after paying out wins, but before paying expenses—
44 See Kulick, supra note 36, at 56-57 (“While Internet gaming and land-based gaming
share a common underlying activity, the practical means of conducting gaming and the busi-
ness model differ.”).
45 See id. at 84–85.
46 See John Warren Kindt, The Economic Impacts of Legalized Gambling Activities, 43
DRAKE L. REV. 51, 82 (1994) (“Gambling is generally legalized for the purpose of capturing
tax revenues.”).
47 See, e.g., Eugene Christiansen, The Impacts of Gaming Taxation in the United States,
AM. GAMING ASS’N (June 2005), http://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/uploads/
docs/whitepapers/the_impacts_of_gaming_taxation.pdf (acknowledging the competing vir-
tues of high tax rates that “satisfy government’s immediate fiscal needs” and low rates that
“shift the policy emphasis . . . toward [long-term] economic development”). For a more
philosophical and constitutional perspective, see William N. Thompson, Gambling Taxes:
The Philosophy, the Constitution and Horizontal Equity, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 389,
410–15 (2010).
48 See 2013 State of the States: the AGA survey of Casino Entertainment, AM. GAMING
ASS’N 11–22 (2013), http://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/uploads/docs/
aga_sos2013_fnl.pdf (providing a state-by-state casino economic impact analysis and noting
the tax rate in each state). For example, Colorado imposes a “[g]raduated tax rate with a
maximum tax of 20%,” while Florida levies a flat 35% rate. Id. at 11–12. Illinois has a
graduated tax rate that may fluctuate between 15% and 50% of gross revenue. Id. at 13.
Maine taxes both the amount wagered and the gross gaming revenues. Id. at 15. The lowest
rate is, perhaps unsurprisingly, in Nevada, with a maximum of 6.75%. Id. at 18. The highest
rate is in Pennsylvania, where slot machines are taxed at 55%. Id. at 21. Variation in tax
rates even within a state is common. See, e.g., id. at 13, 15 (noting Indiana and Louisiana tax
riverboats and land-based casinos differently from racinos); Id. at 21 (noting Pennsylvania
taxes slot machines and table games at different rates); see also IOWA CODE § 99F.11 (2013)
(providing for differing tax rates depending upon the type of casino—riverboat, land based,
or racino—and the presence or absence of other gaming venues in the same county).
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realized by the gaming entity.49 Taxing Internet gambling, however, presents a
unique set of problems. In chapter 3, tax attorney Sanford Millar sets out the
two basic models for this taxation: 1) taxing gross gaming revenues (GGR), or
2) taxing gross deposits. Millar supplies a succinct and helpful analysis of how
these models differ and the benefits and drawbacks of each, as well as recom-
mendations for which model better achieves the objectives of consumer protec-
tion and generation of tax revenue.
Simply put, a GGR model requires operators to pay a percentage of their
“revenues”—that is, the amount wagered by players, less the amount returned
to players as winnings, with deductions for specified expenses.50 A deposit
model, on the other hand, requires the operator to pay a percentage of the
amount of money players deposit into accounts for wagering with that opera-
tor.51 So which approach do operators prefer? Millar says operators generally
prefer the GGR model, and they “lobby heavily to implement GGR tax models
in countries proposing new online gambling legislation.”52 Why this prefer-
ence? In addition to the fact most established operators are more familiar with a
GGR model, the primary reason is the perception that it lowers the business
risk for operators, because they are being taxed only on the profits they real-
ize.53 But as the author points out, from a licensing jurisdiction’s perspective,
the GGR model has several shortcomings.
The most important problem with the GGR is that taxes are collected ret-
roactively, after a set period of time for measuring profits has elapsed.54 This
complicates the process of the taxing entity receiving taxes on a timely or pre-
dictable basis.55 Moreover, the revolving nature of customer accounts and the
payment of promotional credits to customers make tax revenue expectations
even more problematic. GGR amounts would have to be calculated periodi-
cally, adding to the transaction costs of tax collection, a problem made worse
when multiple jurisdictions are involved.56 The deposit model, on the other
hand, is more efficient and predictable for a taxing jurisdiction because it is
based not on profits after the gambling has occurred, but on player deposits
beforehand.57 Likewise, it is “game neutral,” unlike the GGR setting in which
the tax calculation is complicated due to the variety of game types.58
Millar cogently argues that the objections to the deposit model raised by
operators may be overstated.59 An operator needs to examine all aspects of a
49 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 99F.1(1) (defining “adjusted gross receipts”—which are used to
calculate an operator’s tax burden under § 99F.11—as “gross receipts less winnings paid to
wagerers”); John E. Anderson, Casino Taxation in the United States, 58 NAT’L TAX J. 303,
306 (2005) (“The precise definition of the tax base varies from state to state, but the essential
tax base in all cases is . . . gross gambling receipts minus payout for prizes.”).
50 Sanford I. Millar, Taxation of Regulated Internet Gambling, in REGULATING INTERNET
GAMING: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 1, at 87, 90.
51 Id. at 91.
52 Id. at 92.
53 Id. at 90.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 90–91.
57 Id. at 91.
58 Id.
59 See id. (describing critics’ concerns with the deposit tax model as “overly simplistic”).
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jurisdiction’s tax collection model in making business decisions, not just the
form of the basic model. Tax rates, collection methods, and overall tax liability
should be the focus. Further, a deposit tax model lends predictability to the
operator because it is more straightforward and efficient.60 Nevertheless, opera-
tors believe that business risks are higher with the deposit model. For example,
they fear that funds may be deposited, and therefore be subject to tax, but not
put into play by the gambler.61 They also fear that a malicious competitor could
deposit money into an account and immediately withdraw it so as to impose a
tax liability on the operator.62 However, the author says this is an unlikely
scenario.63 Additionally, many of these business risks can be mitigated by
allowing operators to charge customers for early withdrawals, and providing
tax credits for such withdrawals.64 Finally, issuing tax credits for funds with-
drawn by players at the end of a payment period effectively converts the
deposit tax into a “net deposit tax,” further reducing business risk for
operators.65
In a detailed and informative chart, Millar sets out the online taxing poli-
cies of many jurisdictions around the world.66 It is a dizzying array of treat-
ments. In addition to the two basic taxing models described above, there are
also hybrid taxation models that differentiate between types of gambling.67
Australia is one such hybrid jurisdiction. As the author notes, “Australia’s
approach to Internet gambling is complex, particularly because each state and
territory—like each of the United States—regulates its own gaming activities,
subject to a few national restrictions.”68 In Australia, monopoly models, under
which government directly or indirectly operates online gaming sites, exist
alongside license fee models, under which private operators are taxed for their
online activities.69 This seems to hold promise as a model for the US, the
author suggests.70 Online casinos could be taxed at a moderate rate using a
GGR approach, while lotteries and bookmakers could be subject to a net
deposit model.71 In their various forms, hybrid models allow for flexibility in
the multi-jurisdictional setting the US presents. The author puts it succinctly:
“Despite their complexities, hybrid models could also be tailored for each spe-
cific jurisdiction. Different states have very different existing gambling mar-
kets, so each could adopt a model that suits its regulatory, economic, and social
needs.”72
60 Id.
61 Id. at 91–92.
62 Id. at 92.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 118–21.
67 Id. at 92–93.
68 Id. at 108.
69 See id. (using the Australian state of New South Wales as an example; that state has a
monopoly model for its lottery but a license fee model for sports betting and keno).
70 See id. at 118.
71 Id.
72 Id.
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If operators prefer the GGR model and jurisdictions prefer the deposit
model, which model of taxation should a player prefer? Does the deposit model
place limitations on the funds a player would have available for gambling, and
impose restrictions and penalties for withdrawals? While the player’s interests
here might seem to be secondary to the tension between operator and taxing
entity, they should not be forgotten. A taxation model that would effectively
shift the tax burden to the player may not be the best course of action.
Millar’s treatment of the tax issue skillfully analyzes a difficult and arcane
issue, and comprehensibly describes the available taxation models along with
the benefits and drawbacks of each. Taxation questions will be prominent as
Internet gambling grows in the US, and when taxation models are considered,
Millar’s work will be a valuable reference for this discussion.
But even when a suitable tax model is established, other threats to the
accrual of tax revenues to licensing governments exist. Without a detailed set
of provisions for insuring the smooth operation of online games, technical
problems can stanch the flow of tax proceeds. In chapter 4, Richard Williamson
describes in careful detail the importance of a wide range of technical compli-
ance issues: testing and authenticating software, system recovery, game inter-
ruption, and data storage and security, to name just a few.73 These are the
critical nuts and bolts that determine the success of an Internet gaming plat-
form. While land-based casinos deal with technical compliance issues as well,
online gaming lives or dies by its ability to manage these challenges. It is diffi-
cult to imagine a better detailed outline of these issues than the one Williamson
supplies in the book.
3. Keeping the Money Clean
Another threat to the tax revenues flowing to licensing jurisdictions has
considerable notoriety. This is the problem of money laundering. Attorney Stu-
art Hoegner identifies money laundering as, “the single biggest regulatory mat-
ter Internet gaming regulators face from a transactional standpoint.”74 Perhaps
because of the developing nature of Internet gaming regulation and the speed,
international nature, and anonymity of many Internet transactions, there is an
assumption that online gambling is ripe with opportunity for money laundering.
Establishing best practices to curtail money laundering seems to be an essential
part of the online regulatory process.
73 Richard Williamson, Technical Compliance, in REGULATING INTERNET GAMING: CHAL-
LENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 1, at 123, 123–60. The comprehensive list of topics
Williamson discusses over the course of his chapter illustrates just how important technical
compliance is and just how many potential problems can arise. The list includes software
testing and authentication; system recovery; game interruption; control over software
changes; random number generators; interoperability; internal controls to detect and prevent
errors or irregularities; system modifications; emergency approvals; system maintenance;
data security; data storage; disaster recovery; time synchronization; player terms of use;
account registration and controls; prevention of multiple accounts; rules governing or even
prohibiting fund transfers between player accounts; responsible gaming features; account
access controls; and player protections—including from artificial player software, often
called “bots.”
74 Stuart Hoegner, Financial Transactions and Money Laundering, in REGULATING
INTERNET GAMING: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 1, at 187, 187.
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What is money laundering? Simply put, it is a way of disguising the
source of illegally generated funds by processing them through a legal enter-
prise.75 The chapter poses the dual questions of how extensive the problem is,
and whether Internet gaming really is an effective means of money laundering.
Answering these questions is important because, almost by definition, anti-
money laundering protocols make business operation more expensive for legiti-
mate operators, and overreaction can chill business opportunities. Hoegner sug-
gests that despite some claims that the Internet gambling money laundering
problem is extensive, the quantitative evidence as to the pervasiveness of
money laundering is far from clear.76 In fact, many commentators suggest the
problem is overstated, and that, for example, “Internet gambling properly regu-
lated is already difficult to launder money through.”77 Jurisdictions may be
better served using “more nuanced and less alarmist formulations” in establish-
ing best practices.78
Whatever the extent of the problem, there are widespread global efforts to
address the issue. One of the most prominent efforts is the initiative of the
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations for money laundering.
The FATF was established by the G7 countries in 1989, and has 36 members,
including 34 member jurisdictions and two international organizations.79 FATF
has issued forty recommendations on money laundering, which the chapter
examines.80 Several of these recommendations serve as the basis for the
author’s suggestions on best practices, and warrant specific reference.
First, one of the most effective measures against money laundering is for
Internet gambling to be regulated.81 Prohibition promotes efforts to launder
money through online gambling; regulation makes it more difficult.82 The
ironic effect of UIGEA is that it prohibited honest, regulated credit card proces-
sors from being involved in Internet fund transfers.83 Money laundering thrives
in an unregulated environment.
Second, regulators need to identify areas where there are particular vulner-
abilities and direct resources there, rather than taking a “check-box” approach
where one size fits all.84 This is what the author terms a “risk-based” approach
to regulation.85 This is essential for online gaming because technological and
market change will be so fluid that without flexibility, regulators will be over-
whelmed and will squander regulatory resources on ineffective measures.86
75 Id. at 188.
76 See id. at 196 (identifying several reasons why money laundering’s prevalence is difficult
to quantify).
77 Id. at 198 (quoting Joseph M. Kelly et al., How Vigilant Should We Be against Money
Laundering?, 13 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 278, 282 (2009) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (comments of Mark Clayton, a Nevada gaming attorney)).
78 Id. at 197.
79 FATF Members and Observers, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/
pages/aboutus/membersandobservers/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
80 See Hoegner, supra note 74, at 202–08.
81 Id. at 232.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 233.
84 See id. at 234.
85 Id.
86 See id. at 234–35.
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Third, transparency of business, customer, and regulatory relationships is
essential. Anonymity is to be avoided. Nevada’s history of requiring trans-
parency in its regulation of casino gaming is one which should be emulated by
other jurisdictions, the author recommends.87 Of course, this history of regula-
tion is the structural advantage Nevada enjoys over other jurisdictions as brick
and mortar regulations are adapted to the online setting.
Similarly, transactions must be traceable. This means gaming transactions
can be followed to their source and can be reconstructed if necessary.88
Finally, regulators need to have and exercise broad control over many
parts of the structure of online gaming. Availability of records is essential.
Some jurisdictions may condition licensure on the existence of a local corpora-
tion that is otherwise subject to the laws of that jurisdiction.89
Of course, best practices are complicated by the fact that money launder-
ing would not be effective unless there is cooperation among jurisdictions. One
regulatory body has little chance of preventing money laundering on its own.90
As far as the US is concerned, money laundering in the gaming realm is
extensively governed by federal law. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Net-
work (FinCen) operates as a bureau within the Department of the Treasury.91
FinCen implements regulations requiring casinos to report currency transac-
tions exceeding $10,000 (CTRs), and establishes guidelines to prevent “struc-
turing” of financial transactions so as to evade the financial trigger.92
Additionally, casinos must report suspicious patron activity by submitting a
form (Suspicious Activity Report—Casinos, or SAR-C), with suspected money
laundering being a prime concern.93 While these provisions aren’t always scru-
pulously adhered to,94 they carry a substantial disincentive for operators to be
87 Id. at 236–37.
88 Id. at 239.
89 See id. at 241.
90 See International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Ter-
rorism & Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE 11 (2013),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/
FATF_Recommendations.pdf.
91 31 U.S.C. § 310(a) (2012); see Treasury Order 180-01 (Mar. 24, 2003), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/about/role-of-treasury/orders-directives/Pages/to180-01.aspx;
FinCEN’s Mandate from Congress, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, http://www
.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/bsa/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
92 31 C.F.R. § 1021.311 (2013); see 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100 (2013); FinCen Advisory No.
FIN-2009-A003, Structuring by Casino Patrons and Personnel (July 1, 2009), available at
http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/fin-2009-a003.pdf; FinCen Guidance No.
FIN-2008-G007, Recognizing Suspicious Activity—Red Flags for Casinos and Card Clubs
(Aug. 1, 2008), available at http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/html/fin-2008-
g007.html.
93 31 C.F.R. § 1021.320(a)(1), (a)(2)(i), (b)(1) (2011).
94 See Michael Luo, Las Vegas Casino Settles in Money-Laundering Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/28/us/las-vegas-casino-settles-in-money-
laundering-inquiry.html?_r=1& (reporting that the Las Vegas Sands Corporation agreed to
pay the US government over $47 million as a penalty for permitting structured transactions
from—and failing to file a SAR-C about—“a Chinese businessman with a pharmaceutical
company in Mexico who was . . . the biggest all-cash gambler in the history of the Vene-
tian,” and who specifically instructed the Venetian that he did not want the government to
know about his fund transfers).
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cavalier about such matters. In any event, the existence of this federal regime
will relieve states of the need to develop their own set of money laundering
provisions for online gambling. Still, there will undoubtedly be challenges in
adapting these measures to the online world.
IV. GAMBLING ONLINE: HOW DO WE PROTECT THE PLAYER?
As noted in the Introduction to this review, a portion of the book focuses
less on how to regulate the licensee and more on how to protect the player of
online games. The material within the set of five chapters with this emphasis
makes it clear that the necessary protections are numerous. An Internet gambler
needs to be assured that his funds are secure and that he is getting a fair game.
As a matter of social policy, regulators need to establish mechanisms to protect
people from playing too much, and prevent others from playing at all. Finally,
regulators need to discern the proper limits on marketing the availability of
online products.
A. Thwarting Thieves and Stopping Swindlers
In chapter 5, entitled The Protection of Customer Funds, attorney Nick
Nocton refers to several instances around the world in which customer funds
were either threatened or actually lost.95 The most notorious US case involves
Full Tilt Poker; customer funds on deposit with the operator were not secured
and many customers lost part or all of their money.96 These examples make
clear that ensuring customer fund security is an essential part of Internet gam-
bling regulation. But, as the author tells us, there are reasons why complete
protection of customer funds may not be achievable, and why “securing the
safety of a customer’s funds is a far-from-straight-forward task.”97 The primary
reason is that a customer loses control over his funds when he instructs his bank
to transfer money to an online gambling operator.98 When the money is trans-
ferred, whether through the use of a credit card or otherwise, the player
becomes a creditor of the operator.99 Moreover, funds deposited with the oper-
ator go into an account the operator has with its own bank, and the operator
95 Nick Nocton, The Protection of Customer Funds, in REGULATING INTERNET GAMING:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 1, at 161, 163–64. Nocton mentions four spe-
cific instances in which companies allegedly misused funds or otherwise had “accounting
irregularities:” Sporting Options in 2004, and three 2012 incidents—Worldspreads Limited,
Purple Lounge, and 5050 Poker.
96 See Full Tilt Poker’s Ill Founder Pleads Guilty But Avoids Prison, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 16,
2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/16/business/la-fi-poker-guilty-20130416 (“Full
Tilt Poker founder Raymond Bitar [was] accused of using online player funds to finance
[the] company in what prosecutors called a Ponzi scheme.”). The United States recently
retained a settlement company to process Full Tilt repayments, and the process began in
September 2013. Full Tilt Poker Refund Process Begins Today with Email Notices to Play-
ers, OFF SHORE GAMING ASS’N (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.osga.com/artman/publish/arti-
cle_10697.shtml. In February 2014, the first round of repayments were made, “totaling
approximately $76 million.” FULL TILT POKER CLAIMS ADMINISTRATION, http://www.full-
tiltpokerclaims.com/index.php (last updated Apr. 1, 2014).
97 Nocton, supra note 95, at 165.
98 Id. at 164.
99 Id. at 165.
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then becomes a creditor of that bank.100 Not straightforward indeed. And yet,
for an effective model of online gambling to exist, regulators must address this
problem for the players’ sake, and for the sake of the market itself. Players’
incentive to participate will disappear if they do not have confidence in the
security of their money.101 So what is to be done?
Generally, there are two basic models which can serve as the basis of
regulation. On the “restrictive end of the spectrum” is the “full reserve”
approach that has been established in Nevada.102 According to Nevada Gaming
Regulation 5A.125, an online gaming operator must maintain a reserve equal to
the amount of money held in players’ gaming accounts.103 This reserve can
take the form of “cash, cash equivalents, an irrevocable letter of credit, a bond,
or a combination” of these, and the reserves must be calculated on a daily
basis.104 Additional extensive requirements are set out in the regulations.105
In contrast to the full reserve approach is the use of trust accounts. Under
this approach, beneficial ownership of the funds remains with the customer
until the customer uses those funds to gamble.106 A survey of jurisdictions
around the world indicates that there is more flexibility accorded operators
outside the US.107 This seems understandable given the infancy of online gam-
ing in the US; especially in a post-Full Tilt Poker world, regulators here will
likely err on the side of restrictive provisions. One salutary effect of the Full
Tilt Poker debacle is that customers are far more aware of the issue of fund
security.108
There is one important point relating to fund security that bears emphasiz-
ing. According to the author, when the online gambler is playing casino games
like blackjack, or betting on sports, they “typically do not deposit and leave
large sums with the gambling operator for use in future gambling sessions.”109
However, in “community” games like online poker, it is more common for
operators to hold large sums of money for players on an ongoing basis.110 Fund
security regulations should account for the difference between these forms of
gambling, the author suggests.111 But the Nevada “full reserve” provisions do
not do this. Why? Because Nevada authorized only online poker, and not
100 Id.
101 See Stewart, supra note 5, at 8 (noting that especially after Black Friday, “customers
were uncertain about when they would be able to recover funds they had deposited with
operators who were leaving the market, and . . . were understandably leery of gambling
online again”—resulting in greatly reduced traffic to Internet poker websites).
102 Nocton, supra note 95, at 170.
103 Nev. Gaming Reg. 5A.125(2) (2014).
104 Nev. Gaming Reg. 5A.125(1), (6).
105 See generally Nev. Gaming Reg. 5A.125.
106 Nocton, supra note 95, at 165.
107 See id. at 172–84.
108 See id. at 161 (“Players are increasingly aware of the risks involved in depositing funds
. . . particularly after high-profile cases [like] that of Full Tilt Poker.”).
109 Id. at 163.
110 See id.
111 See id. (suggesting fund security measures are “no longer merely a question of covering
potential exposure”—as is typical for operators offering games like bingo and slots—but are
also a question “of ensuring the protection of potentially very significant customer
deposits”).
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casino games.112 The detailed reserve requirements in Nevada may be appro-
priate for poker, and may constitute an admirable “gold standard” of regulation
of that game.113 But this approach may not be suitable for all operators and for
all games. Instead, regulators may be better served by establishing an individu-
alized “risk based” approach to fund security.114
This chapter does a superb job outlining the subtleties of fund security. As
the author makes clear, although this issue is important to an effective regula-
tory system, a “one size fits all” template may be self-defeating.115 No matter
the template, no system can provide complete security of funds,116 and some
systems may place excessive, mechanical restrictions on the industry.117 Ulti-
mately, the author offers two measures that, in one form or another, can serve
as the anchors of regulation: first, establishment of segregated bank accounts
for player funds, with bank acknowledgement of the players’ interests; second,
a bond or some other form of financial instrument requirement that covers at
least the amount of the players’ balances.118 As jurisdictions establish their
online gaming regulatory structures, fund security will be of paramount impor-
tance, in the US and elsewhere.
It is certainly an investment of trust on the player’s part to gamble real
money online. How can an online gambler be assured that he is getting a fair
game? Can operators cheat them out of their money? What regulatory measures
need to be in place to prevent this? In chapter 9, titled Ensuring Internet Gam-
ing that is Free from Fraud and Cheating, Alan Littler says that the “prevailing
European discourse” on this issue focuses on the importance of protecting con-
sumers from “unscrupulous or untrustworthy operators.”119 But this is an
incomplete and misleading view of the problem, he writes.120 Because they are
subject to a variety of criminal and regulatory sanctions, licensed operators
stand to gain very little by cheating players.121 Additionally, an operator’s rep-
112 Nev. Gaming Reg. 5A.140(1)(a) (2014) (“Operators shall not accept or facilitate a wager
on any game other than . . . poker and its derivatives.”). Although Nevada authorized only
poker, residents can still establish accounts with sports books or race books within the state
and make bets using “communications technology approved by the Board.” NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 463.016425(1)(b) (2013). That activity is permissible because it is expressly not within the
definition of “interactive gaming,” and Regulation 5A only governs interactive gaming. Id.;
see Nev. Gaming Reg. 5A.010.
113 See Nocton, supra note 95, at 186.
114 Id.
115 See id. at 161 (“[T]he question of what is ‘best practice’ is a subjective one and must
take into account the unique circumstances facing each jurisdiction.”).
116 See id. at 168.
117 See id. at 185 (questioning whether a trustee-type system might be impractical “in view
of the volume and frequency of transactions”).
118 Id. at 184–85.
119 Id. at 300.
120 See id. at 301 (“[T]he prevention of cheating and fraud is unlikely to be solely a one-
perspective problem.”).
121 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 99F.4(6), (12) (2013) (vesting the Iowa Racing and Gaming
Commission with authority to “take appropriate disciplinary action against a licensee”—
which may include fines, suspensions, and license revocations—or even “institute appropri-
ate legal action for enforcement”); OHIO REV. CODE § 3772.03(A) (Lexis Nexis 2012)
(authorizing the Ohio Casino Control Commission to penalize casino operators for actions
that damage “the integrity of casino gaming”).
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utation can be damaged by participation in cheating, with consequent devasta-
tion to revenues.122 This is true for all types of casino games as well as sports
betting.
A fact to which regulators may not give adequate attention is that opera-
tors can be victimized by cheating and can be used as “conduits for cheating or
fraudulent activities by third parties.”123 Furthermore, a player is more likely to
be cheated by another player than by the operator.124 The chapter prescribes a
number of practices that can help to identify fraud, collusion, and cheating by
players. They include procedures for opening and logging onto player accounts,
monitoring cashouts from accounts, and analyzing player activity to determine
in-play cheating.125 For example, two players always sitting at the same virtual
poker table would raise suspicions that they were colluding.126 Fraud manage-
ment systems are a critical requirement for online operators; safeguards need to
be inserted at multiple stages of the online gaming process.127 One of the
advantages of the online environment as it relates to fraud, collusion, and cheat-
ing is that Internet transactions leave a trail of data that can be examined and
evaluated.128 An operator can mine the data to detect anomalous behavior that
may suggest cheating. But according to the author, these are measures that
operators often undertake for their own protection rather than because of regu-
latory prescription. Apart from the establishment of “generic provisions,” Lit-
tler writes, “[r]egulatory agencies pay little, if any, attention to measures or the
need to implement measures to combat fraud against an operator.”129
Perhaps the biggest obstacle to addressing the fraud and cheating problem
is endemic to the regulation of gaming generally—namely, the “fragmentation”
of regulatory measures and authority along jurisdictional lines.130 When juris-
dictions act severally, the efficiency of initiatives to combat fraud will suf-
fer.131 The cross-border nature of many fraudulent activities makes national,
international and industry cooperation essential, and is the way in which,
“[w]ith time and experience,” the best regulatory practices will be generated.132
Especially in the online gambling world, a jurisdiction that believes it can go it
alone will likely find its regulatory objectives cannot be realized.
122 Alan Littler, Ensuring Internet Gaming that is Free from Fraud and Cheating, in REGU-
LATING INTERNET GAMING: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 1, at 295, 327.
123 Id. at 301.
124 See id. at 329.
125 See id. at 324–25.
126 Id. at 324.
127 See id. at 325. Betfair, one company that offers a fraud management system, touts the
system’s “neural learning capabilities” that continuously analyze player trends and patterns
“to identify anomalous behavior” and adjust the system’s thresholds accordingly. See id.
128 See id. at 324.
129 Id.
130 See id. at 329.
131 See id. at 329–30 (suggesting that a lack of cooperation “weakens the response and the
use of information gathered . . . [because] cheating and fraud occur in a cross-border
context”).
132 Id. at 330.
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B. Who is Gambling? Someone Who Shouldn’t Be?
In chapter 8, attorneys Frank Catania Sr., Gary Ehrlich, and Antonia
Cowan examine the problems of “Responsible Gaming” in the Internet sphere.
As they write, “those who profit from . . . gaming must formulate and imple-
ment policies to minimize any harm resulting from that activity, especially to
the most vulnerable members of society.”133 The issue of problem gambling
has been called the “Achilles Heel” of the industry.134 Tales of ruined lives,
broken families, lost jobs, and suicide cast an ugly shadow over an activity that
the industry likes to refer to as “entertainment.”135 Ultimately, for both altruis-
tic and selfish reasons, the gaming industry has an interest in addressing the
issue of problem gambling.
Any discussion of the issue needs to begin by defining the problem and
measuring its scope. What is meant by the term “gambling problem,” or “gam-
bling disorder?” While the authors maintain there is no standard definition of
the term, they do refer to the clinical criteria for a “gambling disorder” as set
forth in the new edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Psycholog-
ical and Psychiatric Disorders.136 In a non-clinical context, a gambling problem
may be characterized by gambling behavior that creates a disruption in a per-
son’s psychological, physical, social, or vocational life.137 Such actions as pre-
occupation with gambling, “chasing losses,” loss of control over gambling in
spite of serious negative consequences in a person’s life, and lying about one’s
gambling are characteristics of a problem gambler.138 Perhaps in a sense, there
is a “know it when you see it” quality to identifying a person whose gambling
activity has created chaos in some aspect of his or her life.
The articulation of precisely what constitutes problem gambling is func-
tionally related to the condition’s prevalence. Yet, there is serious disagreement
among researchers and experts on the extent of problem gambling. The authors
cite studies finding that “approximately 1 percent of adults meet the existing
133 Frank Catania, Sr. et al., Responsible Gaming, in REGULATING INTERNET GAMING:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 1, at 273, 273.
134 See, e.g., Ronald M. Pavalko, Casino Gambling: Competing with Other Forms of Enter-
tainment, in INDUSTRY STUDIES 194, 208 (Larry L. Duetsch ed., 3d ed. 2002); Michael
Jonas, The Casino Debate’s Achilles’ Heel: “Problem Gamblers” Account for a Dispropor-
tionate Share of Casino Revenues, COMMONWEALTH (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.common
wealthmagazine.org/Voices/Back-Story/2011/Summer/010-The-casino-debates-Achilles-
heel.aspx; Official Warns ‘Net Gamers About Problem Gambling, LAS VEGAS SUN (June 28,
1999, 11:10 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/1999/jun/28/official-warns-net-
gamers-about-problem-gambling/. However, problem gambling is not necessarily the only
thing identified as an Achilles heel for the gambling industry. See Stewart, supra note 5, at
24 (identifying payment processing activities as an Achilles heel specifically for the online
gaming sector); John Warren Kindt, Subpoenaing Information from the Gambling Industry:
Will the Discovery Process in Civil Lawsuits Reveal Hidden Violations Including the Racket-
eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act?, 82 OR. L. REV. 221, 224 (2003) (“[T]he
Achilles’ heel of the gambling industry was the process involving the legal discovery of
information.”).
135 See Catania, supra note 133, at 276.
136 See id. at 276–77.
137 What is Problem Gambling?, NAT’L COUNCIL ON PROBLEM GAMBLING, http://www.ncp-
gambling.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=3286 (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
138 Id.
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criteria for gambling disorder, while an additional 2-3 percent can be consid-
ered problem gamblers.”139 But some researchers have suggested these num-
bers are misleading. First, critics contend, these studies of the prevalence of
problem gambling evaluate only whether individuals have had a gambling
problem in the last year, not whether the person has ever had a problem.140
Lifetime prevalence rates are higher than annual rates, and are a better reflec-
tion of the fact that gambling problems may wax and wane over the years.141
But the bigger problem with the 1 percent number, some critics assert, is
that it is expressed as a share of the adult population generally, not those adults
who gamble regularly.142 It is misleading to say that 1 percent of adults have a
gambling disorder when a large percentage of adults don’t gamble at all, or
gamble only rarely.143 The more relevant percentage for measurement is among
those who gamble regularly, and that number is much higher than 1–3 percent,
critics argue.144
However one measures these numbers, there are legitimate concerns about
the features of Internet gambling that may aggravate problem gambling. As the
authors point out, features such as Internet gambling’s “24/7 availability, its
faster speed of play, the variety of games offered, the smaller permissible bet
size, players’ anonymity and isolation, the possibility that players may gamble
while impaired or under the influence, and players’ decreased perception of the
value of money,” may contribute to the problem.145 There is evidence that an
increasing percentage of problem gamblers are those whose gambling is pre-
dominately or exclusively on machines, rather than on table games or sports
betting.146 Does the Internet “machine,” the computer, pose a similar threat that
will produce higher numbers of problem gambling? The best that can be said is
that “[l]ittle evidence supports a conclusion that online play causes problem
gambling.”147 The fact is that we know very little about how extensive this
problem is or has the potential to be.
Nevertheless, as the authors note, the nature of online gambling provides
operators with technological and data-based capabilities to reduce the incidence
of problem gambling that land-based gambling doesn’t offer.148 These initia-
tives can focus on either the gambler himself, or on the games and conditions
139 Catania, supra note 133, at 278 (citing Malcom K. Sparrow, Can Internet Gambling Be
Effectively Regulated? Managing the Risks, at 61 (Dec. 2, 2009), available at http://www
.hks.harvard.edu/fs/msparrow/documents—in%20use/Can%20Internet%20Gambling%20Be
%20Effectively%20Regulated—Managing%20the%20Risks—12-02-2009.pdf); FAQs—
Problem Gamblers, NAT’L COUNCIL ON PROBLEM GAMBLING, http://www.ncpgambling.org/
i4a/pages/Index.cfm?pageID=3315 (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
140 NATASHA DOW SCH ¨ULL, ADDICTION BY DESIGN: MACHINE GAMBLING IN LAS VEGAS
319 n.57 (2012).
141 Id.
142 Id. at 15.
143 Id. at 320 n.58.
144 See id. at 15.
145 Catania, supra note 133, at 278.
146 See SCH ¨ULL, supra note 140, at 14 (“By the mid-1990s in Las Vegas, the vast majority
attending local meetings of the self-help group Gamblers Anonymous . . . played machines
exclusively.”).
147 Catania, supra note 133, at 278.
148 Id. at 278–79.
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of play.149 The chapter examines some of the practices employed in many juris-
dictions. These include allowing for players to set limits on their deposits,
wagering, or losses.150 A number of jurisdictions provide for gambler imposed
“time-outs,” and for “self-exclusions.”151 Particular emphasis is placed on the
best practices relating to conveying information to players that enables them to
make informed decisions about their gambling activity.152
As noted above, online gaming operators have the ability to gather data
from the online player’s gambling activity. Just as certain activity may indicate
cheating, other activity may serve as a “red flag” for problem gambling. Pro-
gressive increases in the amounts bet and time spent gambling, and requests for
increases in deposit limits or bonuses, among other things, may be an indication
of a gambler in over his head.153 According to the authors, however, “experts”
in the industry downplay the helpfulness of such information. There is “not yet
enough information at the present time to know what the tracking criteria and
ensuing interaction should be.”154 Therefore, “tracking play to detect problem
gambling is not recommended at this time.”155
The authors note that some jurisdictions require “reality checks,” such as
pop up messages notifying players when they have been playing for an
extended period of time or a visible clock in real time.156 Overwhelmingly,
however, the best practices and recommendations that are described place the
responsibility on the player to diagnose and to remedy his gambling problem;
he needs to consult resources to help with his gambling problem and use such
measures as self-exclusions and time outs. This focus treats the issue as one
relating to the gambler’s psychiatric profile rather than as a function of the type
of gambling in which he is engaged.157 Clearly, there is a need for additional
study of this interaction between player and “machine” before regulators can
feel confident that “the most vulnerable members of society” are protected.
There is less disagreement when the discussion turns to the need to pre-
vent minors from gambling online. For operators, the business and legal risks
of minors gambling online are dramatic, as penalties for violations of underage
gambling laws and the inability to collect gambling debts from minors provide
strong incentives to verify a gambler’s age.158 From a societal policy perspec-
tive, the interests that warrant robust efforts to verify a gambler’s age are also
149 Id. at 279.
150 Id. at 284.
151 See id. at 285–87. Jurisdictions with these provisions include Gibraltar, Antigua and
Barbuda, and Nevada.
152 Id. at 290.
153 See id. at 291–92.
154 Id. at 291 (quoting CENTRE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES, RESPONSIBLE
GAMBLING STANDARDS FOR REMOTE GAMBLING PREPARED FOR NOVA SCOTIA GAMING
CORP. 29 (2009)).
155 Id. at 292.
156 Id. at 291.
157 See SCH ¨ULL, supra note 140, at 14 (noting that “the preponderance of research” also
tends to treat the issue this way).
158 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 99F.15(2) (2013) (making it a simple misdemeanor to permit “a
person under the age of twenty-one years to make a wager”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-76-
155(1)-(2) (2013) (providing penalties for permitting underage gambling, including a fine,
jail time, or both); State v. Boardwalk Regency Corp., 548 A.2d 206, 207 (N.J. Super. Ct.
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clear. Some research has shown that between 4 and 7 percent of 6th, 8th, and
11th grade youth reported they had gambled for money on the Internet.159
Moreover, for adolescents, “Internet gambling has been associated with higher
levels of heavy alcohol use and poorer academic performance compared to
non-Internet gambling.”160
The author of chapter 10 on Age Verification, Blair Richardson, offers the
perspective of one who has considerable experience in the age verification
industry.161 As he describes, the gold standard of age verification has become
websites’ “use of government-issued ID databases.”162 This has replaced the
“pseudo-verification” of age by self-reporting plus possession of a credit or
debit card.163 After all, those cards are issued to minors widely and without age
verification.164 The trend to this new form of age verification through databases
can be traced to the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking (PACT) Act that was
enacted in 2010.165 The law was a critical step forward166 because it required
those selling cigarettes online to verify age “through the use of a commercially
available database or aggregate of databases, consisting primarily of data from
government sources, that are regularly used by government and businesses” to
verify age.167 This standard lends itself well to use for online gaming. In fact,
this seems like one area of Internet regulation where the US has established a
standard that is at least as good as that of any foreign jurisdiction.
C. Advertising Restrictions: Out of Sight, Out of Mind?
It seems somewhat odd to view limitations on advertising as a form of
consumer protection, but in the US, the government’s battle against gambling
advertising has a lengthy history. As attorney Lawrence Walters describes in
App. Div. 1988) (affirming civil penalties assessed after a casino “allow[ed] two underage
persons to gamble”).
159 See IOWA CONSORTIUM FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE RESEARCH AND EVALUATION, UNIV. OF
IOWA, 2010 IOWA YOUTH SURVEY: STATE OF IOWA RESULTS 46 (2011), available at http://
www.iowa.gov/odcp/docs/IYS_state_report_2010.pdf; IOWA CONSORTIUM FOR SUBSTANCE
ABUSE RESEARCH AND EVALUATION, UNIV. OF IOWA, 2008 IOWA YOUTH SURVEY: STATE OF
IOWA RESULTS 36 (2009), available at http://publications.iowa.gov/9234/1/iys_statereport
2008.pdf; see also MELVIN E. Gonnerman, Jr. & Gene M. Lutz, CTR. FOR SOCIAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, UNIV. OF N. IOWA, INTERNET POKER: A PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPEC-
TIVE 14 (2011), available at http://www.iowa.gov/irgc/StudyIDPH%20Report.pdf (citing
these two studies).
160 See GONNERMAN & LUTZ, supra note 159, at 15 (citing Marc N. Potenza et al., Corre-
lates of At-Risk/Problem Internet Gambling in Adolescents, 50 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADO-
LESCENT PSYCHIATRY 150, 154 (2011)).
161 Richardson is General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer for Aristotle, a compliance
vendor. J. Blair Richardson, Jr., ARISTOTLE, http://aristotle.com/about-us/team/j-blair-rich-
ardson-jr/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
162 J. Blair Richardson, Age Verification, in REGULATING INTERNET GAMING: CHALLENGES
AND OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 1, at 331, 334.
163 See id. at 335.
164 See id.
165 Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-154, §2A(b)(4)(A), 124
Stat. 1087, 1091-1092 (2010); see also Richardson, supra note 162, at 339.
166 See Richardson, supra note 162, at 339 (calling the law “a significant development in
the field of online age verification”).
167 15 U.S.C. § 376a(b)(4)(A)(iii)(II) (2012).
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chapter 7, Internet Gambling Advertising Best Practices, “online gambling
advertising is inconsistently regulated and often unaddressed.”168 In the US, the
legal status of online gaming advertising is complicated by the inclination of
some to ignore the difference between the legality of online gambling and the
legality of advertising that activity.169 Yet, the government’s power to regulate
these two spheres differs. Walters discusses two cases that resulted from
actions taken by the US Department of Justice (“DOJ”) in 2003 that threatened
online media with prosecution if they offered advertising of online gambling.
The first involved a company called Casino City Network that advertised
lawful overseas companies offering online casino games and sports betting.170
Casino City sought a declaratory judgment that its actions were not subject to
criminal statutes against “aiding and abetting” illegal activity. Because the DOJ
had not actually threatened Casino City with prosecution, however, the federal
district court declined to rule on the merits of Casino City’s claim.171 Neverthe-
less, the court observed that the speech involved—the advertising—was not
protected by the First Amendment because “it was misleading and contained
information regarding illegal activities, namely Internet gaming.”172 After this
categorical declaration of the illegality of all online gambling, the DOJ was
emboldened to pressure advertising outlets like Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo!
to cease such advertising.173 The companies paid over $31 million in fines to
settle claims that they had facilitated illegal activity by allowing this
advertising.174
The second case occurred in 2007 and involved the company BetOnSports
(“BoS”), along with its owner David Carruthers.175 Although BoS offered
online gambling only in jurisdictions where online gambling was legal, it
argued that advertising that might reach US players was legal as well.176 But
the court accepted the government’s argument that because Internet gambling
was illegal in the US, advertising could be prohibited as well, and issued an
injunction against BoS.177 This ruling led to a guilty plea, which ended the case
before a final ruling on the issue could be reached.178
These cases underscore the DOJ’s efforts to treat online gambling adver-
tising as illegal because of its determination that online gambling itself is ille-
168 Lawrence G. Walters, Internet Gambling Advertising Best Practices, in REGULATING
INTERNET GAMING: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 1, at 249, 249.
169 See id. at 250.
170 Id. at 252.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 252–53; Casino City, Inc. v. U.S. DOJ, No. 04-557-B-M3, slip op. at 14–15 (M.D.
La. Feb. 15, 2005), available at http://www.gambling-law-us.com/Articles-Notes/Casino-
City-Decision.pdf (“[T]he speech in which plaintiff wishes to engage is misleading because
it falsely portrays the image that Internet gambling is legal. . . . Because plaintiff’s speech
concerns misleading information and illegal activities, it does not fall within speech that is
protected by the First Amendment.”).
173 Walters, supra note 168, at 253.
174 Id.
175 See United States v. BetOnSports PLC, No. 4:06CV01064 CEJ, 2006 WL 3257797, at
*2 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 9, 2006).
176 See Walters, supra note 168, at 253.
177 See BetOnSports PLC, 2006 WL 3257797 at *9.
178 Walters, supra note 168, at 254.
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gal. As Walters points out, until the legal status of Internet gambling is
established more clearly, these efforts will likely continue.179 The chapter
doesn’t mention the potential effect on advertising of the 2011 DOJ Memoran-
dum, which opined that the federal Wire Act applied only to sports betting.180
But, the restrictive approach to the advertising issue is a clear indication that
the US has miles to go before it becomes a mature online gaming jurisdiction.
The growth of Internet gambling will require a parallel growth in the recogni-
tion and protection of the “expressive activity” of advertising.
V. AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR ONLINE GAMBLING?
As this book effectively illustrates throughout, jurisdictions have very dif-
ferent policy bases and orientations in their regulation of Internet activity,
including online gambling. Given these substantial differences, any prospect
for a uniform approach seems remote. So what would an international Conven-
tion for Internet gambling accomplish? As Professor Marketa Trimble suggests
in chapter 11, an international Convention on online gambling could facilitate
each jurisdiction’s ability to enforce its polices on Internet gambling, while still
respecting the different approaches taken by other jurisdictions. In short, all
jurisdictions would benefit from inter-jurisdictional cooperation, whether they
permit or forbid online gambling activity.
There are several benefits that could flow from the terms of such a Con-
vention. For example, they could provide for enforcement assistance whereby
jurisdiction X that prohibits online poker seeks assistance from jurisdiction Y
that allows it. Imagine a poker operator that offers games to the residents of
jurisdiction X, but has all its assets and officers in jurisdiction Y. Jurisdiction X
might be able to seek the help of jurisdiction Y to make the operator filter its
content for online poker, so that residents of jurisdiction X could not access
it.181 This cooperation is preferable to one jurisdiction using geo-location tech-
nology or firewalls, the author notes, because it provides an enforcement mech-
anism that reaches across borders.182
One can imagine that agreements for exchanging information could have
other benefits.183 They could be a useful weapon against money laundering
efforts, which almost always have an international character. Sharing informa-
tion about fraudulent activities and cheating likewise can thwart criminal activ-
ity. Information about problem gamblers can also be subject to Convention
terms in a way that allows for cross-border enforcement of self-exclusion
179 Id. at 254–55.
180 Virginia A. Seitz, Memorandum Opinion for the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Division: Whether Proposals by Illinois and New York to Use the Internet and Out-of-State
Transaction Processors to Sell Lottery Tickets to In-State Adults Violate the Wire Act 12
(Sept. 20, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/state-lotteries-opinion.pdf.
181 Trimble, supra note 11, at 373.
182 See id at 374.
183 Interestingly, the discussion about international cooperation essentially mirrors the one
occurring in the US about federal versus state-by-state regulation. The benefits of Professor
Trimble’s Convention—for example, uniformity, collaboration, and pooling resources—are
very similar to the ones highlighted by advocates of a federal regulatory approach in the US.
See infra Part VI.
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requests.184 Of course, some jurisdictions may have concerns that Convention
terms would dilute their “territoriality,” or licensing power. But as Professor
Trimble notes, jurisdictions that responsibly regulate online gaming “already
require their licensees to comply with the laws of other jurisdictions,” so there
would be no real surrender of authority.185
Professor Trimble’s proposal does not seek a uniform law for Internet
gambling—indeed, she says that “[g]iven the diversity of national opinions, it
would be pointless” to do so—and she acknowledges the uncertain state of the
law in the US.186 At this point, as states wade more deeply into the online
waters, and while Congress continues to dither, it might be premature to expect
that states just beginning to establish a regulatory framework would be ready to
embrace a Convention. Yet, it is precisely because jurisdictions are now search-
ing for “viable solutions” to the regulation of online gambling, Professor Trim-
ble argues, that a convention would be timely.187 Ultimately, the timing of a
Convention is the only real question that exists; cooperation among jurisdic-
tions is inevitable, necessary, and appropriate. This will be true in the US,
regardless of where the regulatory structure is established, as it will be
elsewhere.
VI. OTHER “CHALLENGES” OF REGULATING INTERNET GAMBLING
A considerable portion of the book, and an even greater portion of this
review, focuses on implementation of best practices in the US Internet gaming
market. Of course, the US is not the only emerging market for Internet gam-
bling, and the text lends itself to application for other jurisdictions as well.
Moreover, the book provides an excellent opportunity for already-established I-
gaming jurisdictions to examine and perhaps improve upon their own regula-
tory models.
Because the book is substantially focused on a “best practices” approach
to Internet gaming regulation, it is understandable that the book does not ana-
lyze the full range of political and public policy issues relating to online gam-
ing. In some instances, however, the policy and political questions being
debated in the US are functionally related to the regulatory issues the book
addresses. Considering some of these questions provides valuable context.
For example, perhaps the central question to ongoing discussion of
Internet gambling in the US is whether the US Congress will, and should, adopt
a model for federal regulation of Internet gambling. For the last several years,
Congressional proposals to license online poker have been floated, discussed,
and then abandoned.188 The initiatives show little sign of either being discon-
184 Trimble, supra note 11, at 383.
185 Id. at 385.
186 Id. at 366–67 (“In the United States, bills have been introduced at the federal level to
both legalize and regulate some or all forms of Internet gambling; however, individual states
hold opposing views on online gambling.”).
187 Id. at 357.
188 See Darren Heitner, Federal Online Poker Legislation: Coming to America or Ship-
wrecked in Congress?, FORBES (Sept. 19, 2013, 8:19 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dar-
renheitner/2013/09/19/federal-online-poker-legislation-coming-to-america-or-shipwrecked-
in-congress/ (explaining why a 2012 federal bill “never made it past the floor of the House of
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tinued or adopted,189 and the gaming commentariat has likewise shown little
fatigue for discussing the issue.190 Currently, Congress’s inaction has effec-
tively left the issue to the states.191
The wisdom of a federal plan for online poker seems obvious to those who
support it. There is a risk that without uniform standards among states, conflict-
ing regulatory objectives and provisions will produce a patchwork pattern of
regulation and an inefficient (unprofitable) marketplace.192 An overarching fed-
eral template, one that would still leave much of the actual regulation to the
states, is necessary to instill confidence and growth, proponents contend.193
Opponents of a federal approach advance a plethora of states’ rights argu-
ments. Gambling regulation has historically been a matter for states to address,
they argue, and differences among state regulatory standards can be addressed
Representatives”); see also Gary Mihoces, New House Bill Would Clear Way for Regulated
Internet Poker, USA TODAY (June 24, 2011, 4:43 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
sports/poker/2011-06-24-house-bill-regulated-internet-poker_n.htm; Liz Benston & Karoun
Demirjian, Harry Reid Rushes Effort to Legalize Internet Poker, LAS VEGAS SUN (Dec. 7,
2010, 2:00 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2010/dec/07/reid-pushes-online-poker-
bill/ (calling the 2010 proposal the “last, best chance for a while to fast-track an effort to
legalize Internet poker”).
189 See, e.g., Dan Friedman, Rep. Pete King Proposes Federal Legalization of Online Gam-
bling, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 6, 2013, 9:29 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/
national/rep-king-proposes-legalization-online-gambling-article-1.1365671; Darren Heitner,
U.S. Government Seeks to Set Internet Poker Free. . . Through New Regulations, FORBES
(July 15, 2013, 9:45 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2013/07/15/u-s-gov-
ernment-seeks-to-set-internet-poker-free-through-new-regulations/ (summarizing a 2013
proposal—the Internet Poker Freedom Act—that is different from King’s bill, but recogniz-
ing “[i]t has a long way to go [before] becoming law”); see also Howard Stutz, New Online
Poker Bill Introduced in Washington, LAS VEGAS REV. J. (July 11, 2013, 4:26 PM), http://
www.reviewjournal.com/business/casinos-gaming/new-online-poker-bill-introduced-wash-
ington (contrasting King’s proposal with the Internet Poker Freedom Act by noting that
King’s bill “would allow all forms of online casino gambling, not just poker”).
190 See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 5, at 18–19; Keith C. Miller, The Internet Gambling Genie
and the Challenges States Face, 17 J. INTERNET L. 1, 19-21 (2013); Chumbley, supra note
26, at 553–58.
191 See Miller, supra note 190, at 19.
192 See Stewart, supra note 5, at 18; Patrick Fleming, Diversity of Online Gambling Land-
scape Creates Ambiguity, JURIST (Jan. 10, 2012, 12:01 PM), http://jurist.org/hotline/2012/01/
patrick-fleming-online-gambling.php; Geoff Freeman, Op-Ed, Policymakers Must Get on
Board with Online Gambling, LAS VEGAS REV. J. (Sept. 19, 2013, 12:49 AM), http://www
.reviewjournal.com/opinion/policymakers-must-get-board-online-gambling.
193 See I. Nelson Rose & Rebecca Bolin, Game On for Internet Gambling: With Federal
Approval, States Line Up to Place Their Bets, 45 CONN. L. REV. 653, 679 (2012) (maintain-
ing that “a national regulatory scheme. . . . would not fundamentally change the states’
regulatory schemes”); Shylene B. D’Addario, Note, The Legalization of Internet Gambling:
Why the Clock is Ticking on Prohibition, 38 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 90, 115–16
(2012) (“Once new federal regulation is in place, statehouses should quickly impose comple-
mentary regulation[s] . . . . Statehouses should work with their local casinos and Native
American tribes to tailor regulation to the needs of the state.”). Under the Internet Poker
Freedom Act of 2013, a proposal introduced in Congress in July 2013, a federal Office of
Internet Poker Oversight would simply designate “qualified regulatory authorities”—such as
states or tribes—that in turn would be responsible for actually making license determina-
tions, enforcing disciplinary actions, assessing civil penalties, and establishing problem gam-
bling assistance programs. See Internet Poker Freedom Act of 2013, H.R. 2666, 113th Cong.
§§ 103–106 (2013).
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by the states themselves, and the marketplace.194 Agreements among states
would tend to normalize the standards.195 Moreover, states would be able to
respond better to technological breakthroughs than the dysfunctional United
States Congress.196
There is little the book could have added to the substance of this debate, as
it has been extensively treated elsewhere.197 Moreover, speculation on what the
future holds would not be consistent with the book’s “best practices” orienta-
tion. But it is worth considering whether, and how, the regulatory model for
online gaming in the US would be different depending on whether it emanated
from the federal government or the states. The book surveys the law of jurisdic-
tions from around the gaming world to glean suggestions and best practices.
But few of these jurisdictions have a federal structure similar to that of the
US.198 If the federal government in the US establishes a regulatory model,
there will be considerable uniformity of regulation. Alternatively, if states are
the entities establishing the regulatory framework, the models of regulation
they create will inevitably differ according to the interests each regulating state
identifies. Especially because the sizable potential for Internet gambling is just
starting to be realized in the US, the reader would benefit from consideration of
how resolving this political issue would affect the landscape of regulation.
194 See, e.g., Jamisen Etzel, Note, The House of Cards is Falling: Why States Should Coop-
erate on Legal Gambling, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 243–44 (2012) (sug-
gesting that state cooperation “could solve many problems related to interstate competition
while maintaining state control . . . . [and could] mitigate market failures without relying on
additional federal laws”); Internet & Mobile Gaming, CASINO ENTERPRISE MGMT., Feb. 1,
2013, available at http://www.casinoenterprisemanagement.com/articles/february-2013/inter
net-mobile-gaming (predicting that “primary responsibility for the regulation of Internet
gambling will be at a state level,” because states can “cooperate so that things that are rela-
tively easy to agree on—like geolocation verification, age and identity verification, [and]
technical standards for the systems—can be standardized”); Letter from Steven Grossman,
Chairman, Mass. State Lottery Comm’n, to Senator Harry Reid & Senator Jon Kyl (Oct. 31,
2012), available at http://www.mass.gov/treasury/docs/10-31-2012-reid-and-kyl-letter.pdf
(objecting “in the strongest possible terms” to “draconian federal limitations” which ignore
the fact that “[g]aming historically has been subject to state regulation”).
195 See Internet & Mobile Gaming, supra note 194 (“We’re right in the start of a new
industry, which gives us the opportunity to . . . get all this stuff consistent so that the systems
they’re using in different states are the same and [there are] not different versions for differ-
ent states.”).
196 See id. (acknowledging “a pretty challenging legislative congressional environment . . . .
[in which] Congress doesn’t seem to be able to agree or get much of anything done”); Miller,
supra note 190, at 21 (“[T]he dysfunctional relationship between Congress and the President
makes any sort of agreement on legislation permitting electronic gambling seem fanciful.”);
cf. Jeffrey D. Zentner, Note, State Regulation of Unsolicited Bulk Commercial E-mail and
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 477, 499 (2006) (“It would be
best for states to continue to regulate . . . .as they are able to be more responsive in a speedier
manner and experiment with various regulatory schemes without requiring the participation
of the entire United States Congress.”).
197 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 190, at 20–21; King, supra note 26, at 66–75; Nevill, supra
note 26, at 228–29.
198 Australia is most similar, because “each state and territory—like each of the United
States—regulates its own gaming activities, subject to a few national restrictions.” Millar,
supra note 50, at 108.
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Another issue that has been a constant source of debate is whether online
gambling should be limited to poker, or opened to all forms of casino gam-
bling. The Editors’ Note declares that Assembly Bill 114, signed by Nevada
Governor Sandoval in February of 2013, “legaliz[ed] online gaming in
Nevada.”199 In fact, the Bill was limited to online poker.200 This is of no small
consequence, as the difference between the two forms of gambling is
fundamental.
With poker, an online operator makes its money by “raking” from the pool
of money players are contesting.201 This is usually a percentage of this pot of
money.202 Consequently, because the house is not a player, there is no statisti-
cal house advantage in poker.203 Online casino games like blackjack, craps, or
slot machines are another matter, however. Here, the gambler is playing against
the house, and the house enjoys a statistical edge that, over time, produces its
winnings.204
Why is this significant? As noted, Nevada has legalized only online poker.
In contrast, New Jersey and Delaware have both legalized casino games as well
as poker.205 Because of the very different nature of the poker-only model vis a´
vis casino games, one might wonder how, if at all, a state’s regulatory provi-
sions would be affected by which games are allowed. When the house is a
direct player in the game, do regulators need to be more vigilant about the
fairness of games? Because poker is a solitary activity while casino games are
not, are problem gambling issues different when casino games are involved?
This issue takes on added significance because many proposals for legaliz-
ing online gambling in the US involve only poker.206 Indeed, poker has
199 Editors’ Note, supra note 7, at ix.
200 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.016425 (2013) (defining “interactive gaming”); Nev. Gam-
ing Reg. 5A.010 (2013) (explaining that Regulation 5A governs interactive gaming); Nev.
Gaming Reg. 5A.140(1)(a) (2013) (“Operators shall not accept or facilitate a wager on any
game other than . . . poker and its derivatives.”). All Assembly Bill 114 did was remove a
provision requiring Nevada to wait until federal law authorized interactive gaming before
allowing interactive gaming licenses to become effective. See Assemb. Bill 114, § 10, 77th
Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2013) (repealing NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.750(2)(h)). Thus, the limitation in
Regulation 5A still holds true.
201 David B. Kuznick, Betting Blind: Problems with Proposed Federal Regulation of Online
Poker, 12 J. HIGH TECH. L. 450, 466 (2012).
202 Id.
203 Michael A. Tselnik, Note, Check, Raise, or Fold: Poker and the Unlawful Internet Gam-
bling Enforcement Act, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1617, 1646 (2007).
204 Robert Hannum, Casino Mathematics, UNLV CTR. FOR GAMING RESEARCH, http://gam-
ing.unlv.edu/casinomath.html (last updated June 5, 2012, 9:45 AM) (listing the approximate
statistical house advantage for most popular casino games and noting that “the house always
wins—in the long run—because of the mathematical advantage the casino enjoys”); see also
Miller, supra note 190, at 25–26.
205 See DEL. CODE tit. 29, §§ 4803(l)–(n), 4826 (2013) (authorizing state lottery officials to
operate internet table games, internet ticket games, and an internet lottery, as defined in
§ 4803); N.J. STAT. §§ 5:12-5 (listing authorized games), 5:12-28.1 (including all authorized
games within the scope of permissible Internet gaming).
206 See, e.g., Internet Poker Freedom Act of 2013, H.R. 2666, 113th Cong. § 107(a) (2013);
S. 51, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (to be codified at CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 19990.14(a)); S. 1068, 85th Gen. Assemb., 2013-2014 Sess., § 6(2)(a) (Iowa 2013) (to be
codified at IOWA CODE § 99F.4E(2)(a)).
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acquired a favored status in the debate of online gambling, and has sometimes
been called “America’s Game.”207 The reasons for this are partly historical and
cultural, and partly the product of skillful marketing by those seeking to have a
poker-only online model. Nevertheless, legislative and popular support for
legalizing the full scope of online casino games is much lower than for poker
alone.208 This dichotomy is an important dynamic that informs the regulatory
challenges presented by online gambling.
Along similar lines, much of the book draws on the experiences and prac-
tices of other countries as a guide for the development of “best practices.” Yet,
most of the jurisdictions surveyed do not limit licensed online gaming to poker.
Rather, they widely permit casino games.209 How valid are comparisons
between regulation of “poker only” models and those providing for licensed
casino games? In the chapter on protecting consumer funds, Nick Nocton sug-
gests this can be problematic. He observes that while Nevada’s requirement
that operators have cash reserves exceeding the amount of player funds “may
represent a gold standard for consumer funds protections with regard to
poker . . . it does not necessarily lend itself as well to the regulation of all forms
of gambling, nor perhaps to all jurisdictions.”210 It might have been worthwhile
to examine this issue in other settings as well.
One final note on a poker-only model that warrants attention is the issue of
liquidity. In the Internet poker context, “liquidity is a measure of how many
gamblers it takes to make for an attractive gambling opportunity, especially as
it relates to drawing persons from gambling platforms not [licensed] by the
state.”211 What makes an online poker site desirable, in addition to the very
important matter of security of funds, is when the player has a number of
games from which to choose, at different stakes levels.212 The number of other
poker players to compete against affects the “action” available.213
207 See, e.g., State v. Randall, 256 P. 393, 394 (Or. 1927) (referring to “the great American
game of poker”); CABOT & MILLER, supra note 13, at 584; Anthony Cabot & Robert Han-
num, Poker: Public Policy, Law, Mathematics, and the Future of an American Tradition, 22
T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 443, 447 (2005) (collecting sources that agree “the game the world
now knows as poker is uniquely American”); James McManus, Op-Ed, No More Bluffing,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/25/opinion/poker-an-ameri-
can-pastime-and-a-game-of-skill.html?_r=1& (“Poker is America’s card game, some say its
national pastime.”).
208 See Miller, supra note 190, at 21–22.
209 See Millar, supra note 50, at 118–21 (providing a chart of surveyed countries with a
column containing the “online game categories” permitted in each jurisdiction, and showing
that many jurisdictions permit online casino games either expressly or through comprehen-
sive regulation).
210 Nocton, supra note 95, at 186.
211 Miller, supra note 190, at 24; see SALLY GAINSBURY, INTERNET GAMBLING: CURRENT
RESEARCH FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 15 n.2 (2012); Stewart, supra note 5, at 6, 9.
212 Miller, supra note 190, at 25; see IOWA RACING & GAMING COMM’N, REPORT ON THE
POSSIBLE REGULATION OF INTRASTATE INTERNET POKER IN THE STATE OF IOWA vi (2011),
available at http://www.iowa.gov/irgc/StudyIntrastate%20Internet%20Poker.pdf.
213 See Chris Sieroty, Panel Says Critical Mass Matters for Online Poker, LAS VEGAS BUS.
PRESS, May 16, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 11490654 (“Poker players want to be able
to play a game at any hour . . . . That requires having a large enough pool of players to play
against.”).
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The liquidity issue will be especially important in the US if the regulatory
structure for Internet gambling is established by individual states—not the fed-
eral government—and the games allowed are limited to poker. A central oper-
ating principle of state-regulated Internet gambling is to require players to be
physically located within the state offering the gambling.214 Sophisticated
“geo-location” technology has been developed that helps to insure this.215 But
unless a state has a population large enough to generate a significant number of
poker players and games, players will not find the games attractive or lucrative
enough to warrant migrating from poker games offered by an offshore unregu-
lated provider.216 A state like California with a large population and a large
number of poker players won’t be affected.217 But smaller states certainly will.
It appears likely that even Nevada, which has been aggressive in establishing
an online poker regulatory structure, will face liquidity issues.218
So, what can be done about the liquidity problem? One way to address it is
to allow casino games as well as poker.219 As noted, this is what has been
authorized in New Jersey and Delaware. Liquidity is not relevant to casino
games because each player is competing against the house. No “critical mass”
of players is necessary. Again, it seems important to consider the possibility
that a casino-based Internet regulatory structure will have different features
than a poker-only one. The difference between games where the operator does
not participate as a player and makes money through a “rake,” and games
where the house/operator is a direct contestant with a statistical edge, is neither
subtle nor unimportant.
Another way of addressing liquidity issues for online poker is to allow for
“shared liquidity”—that is, to allow jurisdictions to pool their players and
games to create more of both and make the games more attractive.220 Many
proponents of online poker regard this as important, if not essential, to the
feasibility and growth of this product.221 In establishing online poker, the
214 See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 29 § 4826(b); N.J. STAT. §§ 5:12-28.1, 5:12-100(h)(6); S. 51,
art. 5, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (to be codified at CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 19990.35(b)); S. 768, 27th Legislature, 2013 Reg. Sess., § 2-13(b)–(c) (Haw. 2013).
215 See King, supra note 26, at 58–59.
216 IOWA RACING & GAMING COMM’N, supra note 212, at vi (“A network that does not have
a high level of liquidity may not meet expectations . . . . Subsequently, players may not make
the transition to a network with less perceived or actual liquidity.”).
217 See Ingo Fielder, UNIV. OF HAMBURG INST. OF L. & ECON., ONLINE POKER: THE ONLINE
POKER DATABASE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAMBURG (OPD-UHH) 28 (2012), available at
http://www.wiso.unihamburg.de/fileadmin/bwl/rechtderwirtschaft/institut/Ingo_Fiedler/On
linepoker_and_the_OPD-UHH.pdf (estimating that California is home to over 175,000
online poker players).
218 See Sadonna Price, Nevada Casinos Need Extension to Test Online Poker Product,
4FLUSH (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.4flush.com/online-poker-news/nevada-casinos-need-
extension-to-test-online-poker-product/14969 (noting about 500 players currently play on the
internet poker sites Nevada has established, which means liquidity could be a “major issue
facing operators in the state”).
219 See Miller, supra note 190, at 26.
220 Id. at 26–27. This may mean sharing players not only with other states, but even with
foreign jurisdictions.
221 See, e.g., id. at 27; I. Nelson Rose, The DOJ Gives States a Gift, 4 UNLV GAMING L.J.
1, 8 (2013); Sue Zeidler, MGM CEO Sees Nevada/NJ Online Gambling Compact in 2014,
REUTERS (Aug. 6, 2013, 5:47 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/06/net-us-mgm-
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Nevada Legislature specifically authorized the Governor to investigate the pos-
sibility of state cooperation.222 But, combining regulatory systems would not
be a simple task and would require states to adapt their regulatory model to
some extent. Given many states’ apparent preference to have a poker-only
model, the effect of market liquidity on the regulatory regime adopted warrants
careful attention.
VII. CONCLUSION
Like the industry itself, the study of online gaming is in its infancy. As
often happens, the law lags behind advances in technology, and that is certainly
the case for Internet gambling regulation. In ten years, the law will likely still
be playing catch up to what technology can deliver. Yet, this book will not be
outdated anytime soon. What makes the book so useful is that it addresses the
range of issues policy makers are struggling to address now. And in one form
or another, many of the same issues will likely be vexing regulators in the
future as well. A comprehensive best practices resource like this will be a
handy reference for legislators, regulators, and all those who are interested in
the development of an evolving form of gambling that soon will be a corner-
stone of the gaming industry.
onlinegambling-idUSBRE97515520130806 (identifying potential benefits apart from greater
liquidity, like enabling “states to share resources for identifying the location of gamblers,
guarding against under-age gambling, stolen identities and credit card fraud”).
222 Assemb. B. 114, 77th Reg. Sess., § 6(1)(a) (Nev. 2013) (instructing the Gaming Com-
mission to “authorize the Governor . . . to [e]nter into agreements with other states, or
authorized agencies thereof, to enable patrons in the signatory states to participate in interac-
tive gaming offered by licensees in those signatory states”). Since February 2013, when
Assembly Bill 114 was passed, Nevada decided it should perhaps pursue international com-
pacts as well. See Assemb. B. 360, 77th Reg. Sess., § 12 (Nev. 2013) (replacing Assembly
Bill 114’s language with even broader language authorizing the Governor to enter into
agreements “with other governments” (emphasis added)).
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